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Abstract
The principal aim of our study is to amass empirical evidence for the effects that audit
market competition and product market competition have on audit pricing. Audit
markets are defined in the context of the industry segments and the US Metropolitan
Statistical Areas where these markets are operative, and an auditor’s industry location
is specified relative to the auditee, that is, we determine, for each case, the auditor–
auditee industry alignment. Using audit fees data for the years 2003 through 2010, we
document a positive correlation between audit fees and product market competition
(competition between auditees), but a negative correlation between audit fees and
audit market competition. We also investigate the link between the spatial clustering
of auditees in urban agglomerations and the level of audit fees charged by auditors.
We find that the size or the centrality of the city where an auditee is headquartered
correlates positively with the audit fees they pay. After calculating the distance from
each auditee headquarters to the central offices of the Security Exchange
Commission, we find that auditees located closer to Washington, D.C., pay lower
audit fees. Finally, we include in our model the 150-hour education requirement to sit
for the CPA exam in the US. We find that audit fees have steadily increased since
2000, the when this education requirement was first implemented.
Keywords
Auditor–auditee industry alignment, Audit Fees, Audit Market Competition,
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Product Market Competition, Spatial Competition,
Standard Industrial Classification, Urban Agglomeration, US Market, 150-Hour
Education Requirements.
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1. Introduction
Research on the market for audit services has grown significantly during the last two
decades. These studies have aimed to shed light on what factors influence the level of
fees paid for providing audit services. Johnson, et al. (1995) and Cobbin (2002)
provide a review of research in audit fee determinants in countries such as Australia,
Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. They report that these studies (e.g., Francis,
1984; Firth, 1985; Francis and Simon, 1987; Low, et al., 1990; Chan, et al., 1993;
Johnson, et al., 1995) engage regression analysis (especially an ordinary least squares
model) to identify firm specific variables and provide evidence for the association
between audit fees, on the one hand, and auditee size, auditee complexity, loss
exposure, auditee risk, and auditor size, on the other. Current research is also gauging
the effect that specialization has on audit fees. Specialization, one of the five top
issues impacting CPAs in the twenty-first century (AICPA , 1998), has become
critical to survival in the industry.
Of particular concern are the effects of price competition on audit fees and,
ultimately, on audit quality. This debate is dominated by those who argue that price
competition is detrimental to audit quality and so to consumers of accounting
information. Studies done by Chan, et al. (2004) suggest that price competition makes
for fewer lower cost participants in a market, which then leads to a general decrease in
audit fees. Similarly, the findings of Chan (1999) and De Angelo (1981) suggest that
price competition is a necessary condition for lowballing and that the dominant firms
in a market are only able to command fee premiums in the absence of price
competition. Also, regulators may be concerned about the impact of higher auditor
concentration on competition, since it may lead to auditors having monopolistic
power in audit pricing (Chen and Elder, 2001; Jensen and Payne, 2003).
Low-ball1 is a term for an offer that is significantly below the fair value of an asset or
group of assets. A low-ball offer for a security, for instance, would be any purchase
offer that is considered to be unfairly low even though that offer might be a best offer
because of distressed securities or the seller’s desperate position.
1 The definition for Low-ball was derived from http://www.investopedia.com
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In Agency Theory, auditing is understood as a type of bonding contracted by an agent
management team with its own shareholders in large companies having specialized
ownership and control or by the proprietor of a business with his creditors and/or
partners. According to this view, the bonding of auditing has, in effect, two clients: an
agent who, by means of the audit, wishes to bond his activities and a principal who
wishes to monitor that agent. Although auditors usually are legally contracted by a
company, the economic relationship is more complex than it may at first seem, and so
both the management of the company and its shareholders might, at times, be
considered the contracting party (Baggs & De Bettignes, 2007). An audit committee
may, however, modify this allocation of roles by changing the audit from a bonding
mechanism into a monitoring in which the contractual initiative comes from the
principals, particularly from the shareholders when they are represented on a
relatively independent audit committee (Arrunada, 1999).
Economic agents employ auditing services to increase the informative value of
accounts and, in this way, reduce the transaction or agency costs incurred in
contractual dealings principally with creditors and shareholders (Arrunada, 1999).
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), one agency cost are the monitoring costs
incurred by shareholders to monitor the managers’ actions, while other agency costs
cited are bonding costs and residual loss (Nikkinen & Sahlström, 2004). Agency costs
are zero when monitoring costs amount to zero and also when an industry, public or
private sector, has both enough managers who own firms outright and enough firms
which are entirely under the management of a single person (Friedman, 1970;
Leventis, et al., 2011).
Economists have long debated the effects of competition in the audit services market
and the role of regulation in determining the optimal level of competition (Jensen &
Payne, 2003). As Caves (1980, pp.88) reports, there certainly is a “vague suspicion
that competition is the enemy of sloth”, but the research has yet to come to a full
understanding of precisely how competition improves managerial effort. Competition
may, on the one hand, put direct pressure on firms to increase quality, but competition
may, on the other, also reduce agency costs, thus making it cheaper for the principal
to draw forth more effort from the agent (Baggs & De Bettignes, 2007).
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Chan, et al. (2004) engage an alternative economic example, adapted from the spatial
competition model of Hotelling (1929), in order to explain behavior in the audit
market. They show that the equilibrium audit fee offered to a prospective auditee is
directly related to the production costs of the next closest auditor in a competitive
space. So auditors are not price setters and do appear to respond to competition.
Apparently, to gain more control over pricing, auditors will attempt to differentiate
their services away from their competitors by specialization and/or increased training
in a particular market. If these tactics fail, the auditors are forced either to move
toward their competitors’ pricing or to exit the market (Jensen & Payne, 2003).
Our study takes this investigation into the pricing of audits further to examine not just
industry specialization and size of auditor but also the effects of competition through
differentiation. The majority of audit fee studies treat fee premiums for Big N auditors
or industry specialists, but we follow Numan and Willekens (2012) in the attempt to
determine whether such premiums arise from specialized industry knowledge per se
and/or from the market power effects of differentiation from competitors.
Extensive evidence has been gathered to prove that the auditing profession is also
subject to the urban wage premium because average auditor salaries are significantly
higher in metropolitan areas. The connection between city size population and amount
of salary is no new trend. For over a century, it has been documented in countries
around the world (Francis, et al., 2012). In this dissertation too, we will examine this
connection for the metropolitan areas where the firms of our sample are
headquartered.
Throughout the world, the accounting profession maintains certain requirements for
entry such as education, experience, high moral standing, and successful completion
of a qualifying examination. We use as a measurement of education the widely-
adopted 150-hour education requirement in the US (AICPA, 1999), and from this we
conclude that audit fees continue to increase the longer the 150-hour requirement has
been in place.
Also, we ask whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement
preferences influence audit fees by testing for a correlation between the pricing of
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audits and the distance from the SEC’s office in Washington, DC to an auditee’s
headquarters.
We use a proprietary data set of only audit fees data for the US market. We chose the
US audit services market because we have access to proprietary data downloaded
from a single data base, Compustat, and because the time period of our research
(2003-2010) includes years immediately after the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002, a time of potential increased scrutiny of non-audit services in
USA.
The US audit services market, though, is also key to research in this area because it
provided the early focus for research into what determines audit fees; moreover, it
was about this market that, between the years 1980 and 2000, 27% of auditing
research was conducted (Cobbin, 2002). Although many previous studies, the earliest
of which focus on the US audit services market, have considered company-specific
and auditor-specific determinants for different environments (e.g. Simunic, 1980;
Palmrose, 1986; Francis & Simon, 1987), few of the recent studies, and especially
those about the US market, consider explicitly the relationship between agency costs
and product market competition. Our study is intended to fill this gap. Also, in our
effort to locate the factors which determine audit fees, we have run calculations on the
quantitative data (demographics, competition data, and financial statements data) and
the qualitative data (dummies) which we collected. Our findings should provide new
insight into the determinants of audit fees, and this insight, we hope, will point to
policy implications for regulators seeking to monitor audit fees better.
We have organized this dissertation into five central chapters. The chapter entitled
“Auditing in USA” takes a look at the profession in that country before and after the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The next chapter, “Theoretical Background and Empirical
Evidence” investigates a wide spectrum of audit fee determinants in the US. The
chapter “Eleven Hypotheses” puts forward the hypotheses we test against our data. In
the chapter “Research Design” we complete the description of our procedures for
sample selection and model specification. Finally, the chapter “Empirical Results and
Discussion” reports the findings of our regression analysis
Auditing in USA
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2. Auditing in USA
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, named after co-creators Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland
and Representative Michael Oxley of Ohio, was passed in July 2002 as a reaction to
the multi-billion dollar accounting scandals at Enron (December 2001) and
WorldCom (June 2001). Congress wanted to restore investor confidence in corporate
America. But after the indictment of Arthur Andersen by the US Department of
Justice the audit market became more concentrated. A 2003 study conducted by the
US General Accounting Office clearly shows the consolidation of public accounting
firms. The demise of Arthur Andersen also changed the dynamics of audit pricing. As
a result, it has become harder to lowball audit fees.
Between 2002 and 2004, the audit market witnessed unprecedented changes (Huang,
et al., 2009). Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in 2002 and implemented the next year by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Section 404’s requirement for
internal control reporting for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004 for
accelerated filers was also applied in 2002. Section 404 presented the auditors with a
new mandated source of revenue, thus giving them less incentive to cut back on audit
fees for new auditees.
The Congress in 2002 established a nonprofit corporation, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which is oriented on supervising the audits of
public companies in order to secure stakeholders and shareholders interest by
promoting informative, accurate, and independent audit reports. Also, in an attempt to
promote investor protection, the PCAOB oversees the audits of broker-dealers,
including compliance reports filed pursuant to federal securities laws. Sarbanes-
Oxley, which played an important role in the establishment of the PCAOB, made
auditors of US public companies subject to independent and external control for the
first time in history. This framework of stricter regulation frame enabled the SEC to
have oversight authority over the PCAOB, including approval of the Board’s rules,
standards, and budget.2
2http://pcaobus.org
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Before Sarbanes-Oxley, auditing firms were self-regulated—investors called them
watchdogs—and they performed substantial non-audit or consultancy work to the firm
they audited. Much consulting conflicted with their auditing activities; so many
auditing firms were entering into a conflict of interests.
The change in the audit environment that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought made the
US audit market very attractive from researchers’ point of view, especially when
considering the impact this Act has had in the audit market and on audit fees.3
Many papers have studied the empirical consequences of Arthur Andersen bankruptcy
in 2002, mainly with regard to the decisions made by ex-AA auditees or by their new
auditors. Cahan and Zhang (2006) analyze whether auditors of ex-AA auditees choose
more conservative accounting policies. Kealey, et al. (2007) argue that when new
auditors perceive the risk of litigation to be higher, they charge higher fees to the ex-
AA auditees. And Blouin, et al. (2007), using data on ex-AA auditees’ choices of
auditor, put forward evidence for agency costs and switching costs. Since Sarbanes-
Oxley has formed the focus of so much of the research, our study concentrates on the
post-Sarbanes-Oxley period.
3 The effect of Sarbanes-Oxley in increasing audit fees has been amply documented (Griffin & Lont,
2007).
Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence
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3. Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence
This chapter mentions the most relevant audit fee determinants in the US market
while discussing a significant number of the studies that find correlations between
these determinants and audit fees.
3.1. Audit fees and the incumbent auditor’s location in the audit
market
Numan and Willekens (2012) argue that auditors can use industry specialization to
differentiate their products and so soften price competition, or in other words, provide
the conditions for a differentiated-product oligopoly. Any auditor will examine how
an incumbent auditor’s location in the market affects audit pricing.
In this dissertation, the market location of incumbent auditors is measured relative to
the auditee, or in other words, the auditor–auditee industry alignment. We want to
find whether the audit fee charged correlates with the degree of alignment between
the market-incumbent auditor’s differentiation strategy and the auditee’s preferences.
To construct such location measure for the audit market, we first needed to define the
relevant audit market segments in which auditors compete through differentiation, so
we used as our unit of analysis local audit offices (as defined by the auditee’s
Metropolitan Statistical Area) and national auditors. Next, testing our hypothesis, we
located the auditor relative to the auditee by setting the auditee’s industry as the
underlying auditee characteristic against which the auditor is aligned. With this we
have employed a measure of auditor industry expertise known as alignment client
(AL_CLNT). Alignment client is the industry portfolio share where this is defined as
the revenue share an auditor generates in a 2-digit Standard Industry Classification
(SIC) industry relative to the total revenue generated by an auditor in a Metropolitan
Statistical Area.
We find that, consistent with our hypotheses, audit fees increase with the degree of
auditor–auditee alignment, as measured by the auditor portfolio-based proxy for
industry specialization.
MSc in Banking and Finance
88
3.1.1. Competition control variables
As an audit market competition proxy (COMP_AF), we engage the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for each industry in the Fama-French classification. This
index, which is widely used in the Standard Industrial Organization literature, is
calculated as the sum of the squared market share of all auditors operating in an
industry for a given year. Moreover, previous studies on audit fee report on the
significance of the HHI (Pearson & Trompeter, 1994).
The HHI concentration per audit market is calculated as:
=
(where i stands for an audit office in an audit market and s for market share in an audit
market based on audit fees). An audit market is defined as a two-digit SIC industry in
a US Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as defined by the US Census Bureau.
We follow Degryse and Ongena (2005) and include in our model the COMP_AF as a
control variable for potential market power effects deriving from supplier
concentration. In addition to COMP_AF, we use the following control variables
(discussed in detail at the end of this chapter) for their impact on audit pricing: size of
auditee (SIZE), auditee firm’s number of business segments (LNSEG), and risk
(Return on Assets, Leverage, Beta, Market to Book ratio, Going Concern condition,
Financial restatements over the previous fiscal year). Also, indicator variables are
used for non-December year-end (FIS) and for year and industry effects. Lastly, we
deemed it important to control for industry specialization effects at the national level
(NAT_SHARE) because evidence indicates a direct impact of both national and
office-specific industry expertise on audit pricing (Francis, et al., 2005; Ferguson, et
al., 2003).
3.2. Audit fees and product market competition
We aim to test for any correlation between product market competition and audit fees.
In this, we are pursuing the assertion of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that competition
in product markets does not eliminate agency cost. In addition, the research suggests
that, since shareholders operating in competitive industries need not bear the costs of
Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence
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monitoring agents, product market competition reduces audit fees. So, we want to test
the competing claims about the relationship between agency cost and product market
competition. We consider the audit fee to be a specific and measurable agency cost,
and so, by asking whether increased competition in the product market is associated
with reductions in audit fees, we are searching for the effect competition has on a
specific agency cost.
Leventis, et al. (2011) assert that reductions in the monitoring costs of the audit are
compensated for when competitors monitor more closely management. Under these
circumstances, an auditor will experience pressure to reduce fees. Where product
market competition is relatively low, on the other hand, owners of the auditee cannot
rely on market forces to monitor the activities of management but must depend on
audit assurance. This means higher audit fees.
We control for industry competition (COMP), which we, in turn, proxy with the HHI.
And in order to calculate the HHI based on the industry market share of each firm of
our sample, we use SIC codes. The result ranges from 0 to 1, that is, from numerous
small companies to a single monopolistic producer.
The advantage the HHI has over such measures as the concentration ratio is that it
gives more weight to larger firms. Generally speaking, an increase in the HHI
indicates a decrease in competition and an increase in market power, while a decrease
in the HHI indicates the opposite. The US Department of Justice, using whole
percentages so that the HHI ranges from 0 to 10,000, interprets HHI market results as
follows: below 1,000 is a competitive marketplace, 1,000-1,800 is a moderately
concentrated marketplace, and above 1,800 is a highly concentrated marketplace.
When a merger in a concentrated market causes the HHI to jump by 100 points or
more, antitrust officials are normally alerted.
3.3. Audit fees and Urban Agglomeration
For over a century, labor economists have remarked the ways in which highly skilled
workers’ agglomerating in metropolitans has brought about positive externalities
arise, thus putting in place the primary determinants of local productivity and wages
(Marshall, 1890; Weber, 1899). In our attempt to detail the levels and the structure of
MSc in Banking and Finance
1010
audit pricing, we examine one channel through which the geographical agglomeration
of economic agents in big cities creates local segmentation in audit markets.
According to evidence provided by Möller and Haas (2003),Gould (2007) and
Bacolod, et al. (2008), companies clustered in metropolitan areas pay higher salaries
than their non-urban counterparts, after cost of living factors have been adjusted for.
This pay gap becomes even larger when it comes to highly skilled individuals.
The research offers two explanations for these findings. The first notes the numerous
employment opportunities available to highly educated individuals in densely
populated areas and argues that, in such competitive labor markets, workers can be
better matched with better jobs and get paid the value of their marginal product
(Helsley & Strange, 1990; Helsley & Strange, 1991; Glaeser, et al., 1992). The second
explanation begins with the relation between economic density and positive
externalities to workers and, from this, argues that knowledge spillovers, access to
private information, and business connections foster the accumulation of human
capital and make possible top performance in the professional workplace. The result
is higher salaries (Christoffersen & Sarkissian, 2005; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996;
Yankow, 2006; Gould, 2007).
Either of these explanations might describe the audit sector of metropolitans, because
it too employs highly skilled workers who, in comparison to their non-urban peers,
earn higher salaries. We want to examine whether this pay gap plays an important role
in the determination of audit fees.
In order to analyze the relations between size of city, centrality of city, and audit fees
paid by local firms, we follow Weisbenner and Ivkovich (2005); Loughran and Schulz
(2005), and others in aggregating headquarters locations by metropolitan statistical
areas and determining the size of the city where the firm is headquartered as well as
distance from the areas with the major population so as to classify firms as Urban
Agglomerates, Urban, or Rural. In this classification system, as well as our use of a
company’s headquarters as a proxy for its location, we follow a number of
researchers, including Coval and Moskowitz (1999); Weisbenner and Ivkovich (2005)
and Loughran and Schulz (2005). We use the dummy variables UA, U, and R to stand
for, respectively, Urban Agglomerates, Urban, and Rural firms.
Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence
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In accordance with the research, a company is classified as an Urban Agglomerate
firm if it is headquartered in one of the ten largest consolidated metropolitan areas of
the United States. Because our sample of data from the period between 2003 and
2010, we determine Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSA) with
reference to the 2010 US Census. The CMSAs for this period include New York City,
Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Philadelphia, Washington, Miami, Atlanta,
and Boston. Previous studies using data from the 2000 US Census named San
Francisco and Detroit CMSAs, but population growth in Miami and Atlanta during
the intervening ten years gave these cities CMSA status. Companies headquartered in
a suburb of one of a CMSA city must be also encountered in the Urban Agglomerate
portfolio. Urban is used for companies not classified as Urban Agglomerate but
headquartered in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) with at least 1 million
residents as found by the 2010 US Census. Finally, as rural firms are defined those
headquartered in MSAs with less than 1 million residents as found by the 2010 US
Census and at least 250 kilometers away from Urban Agglomerate and Urban firms.
Most local authorities in major urban areas provide more audit services than local
authorities do in rural areas and thus auditors may charge higher fees for firms that are
part of urban agglomerate and urban areas.
In order to classify a firm according to size of city, we took latitude and longitude
data and compute the distance between firm headquarters and both the ten CMSAs
(including their suburbs) and the MSAs with populations of at least 1 million as found
by the 2010 US Census. Latitude was measured from the Equator, with positive
values going north and negative values going south, and longitude was measured from
the Prime Meridian, with positive values going east and negative values going west.4
We used the standard formula for computing the distance d(a, b) in statutory
kilometers between two points a and b, as follows:( , ) = ⌊ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) + ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ ( ) ( ) ⌋
(Where and denote the latitudes and longitudes of the two points (expressed in
radians) and denotes the radius of the earth, which is approximately 6,378 statutory
4 http://jwocky.gsfc.nasa.gov/teacher/latlonarchive.html
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kilometers).5 After calculating the distances of each Urban and Urban Agglomerate
firm from the remaining firms, we calculated the minimum of these distances so that
we could have the distance of all remaining firms from the nearest Urban and Urban
Agglomerate firm.
3.4. Demographic control variables
Cost of living
In order to test the relative impact of our independent variable, we set a number of
control variables. First, we needed to control for cost of living (LVCOST) across
localities, which was collected manually for every five-digit ZIP code of our sample
from Sperling’s Cost of Living Index Calculator6. Sperling’s Calculator is based on
the costs of housing, transportation, utilities, food, and miscellaneous expenses such
as services, entertainment and clothing. Although previous studies have controlled for
the cost of living in the cities of their samples, we attained greater accuracy using
cost-of-living data for each and every five-digit ZIP code.
Previous studies have concluded that there is such a thing as an urban wage premium,
so we expect auditors to be charging higher fees to Urban Agglomerate and Urban
firms. Higher audit fees and a nominal urban wage premium may simply reflect a
higher cost of living in large cities, which implies that once the local cost of living has
been controlled for, the audit fees being charged by otherwise similar urban and non-
urban firms should exhibit no real difference.
In controlling for cost of living, we follow DuMond, et al. (1999), in using local cost
of living as an explanatory variable rather than deflating all compensation measures
by cost of living. Most cost of living measures (including ours) are based on a
Laspeyres index that makes comparisons between relative prices for the same bundle
of goods. Since the bundle is fixed, it does not accurately measure the compensating
differential necessary to providing equivalent utilities across any two regimes.
Measured price indices don’t compensate enough for price differences when the move
is made from low cost-of-living areas, where the priced bundle of goods is suboptimal
5 The alternative formula that we used is:  d(a,b)=acos(cos(radians(90-a1))*cos(radians(90-
a2))+sin(radians(90-a1)) *sin(radians(90-a2)) *cos (radians(b1-b2))) *6378
6The demographics per five-digit-Zip were derived from http://www.bestplaces.net/col/
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and left unpurchased) to average cost-of-living areas, where the priced bundle
provides the preferred (i.e., utility-maximizing) mix of goods and services. But when
the move is made from average cost-of-living areas to high cost-of-living cities, price
indices overcompensate for price differences. In either case, the difference between a
utility-constant price index and a standard fixed bundle index founts from the ability
of workers to alternate their consumption mix from that measured in the fixed bundle.
DuMond, et al. (1999) argue that the cost of living index systematically overstates the
true cost of living in more expensive areas, since it is calculated using a fixed bundle
of consumer goods and services. They also state the absence of a linear relation
between wages and prices, due to the consumers’ tendency on substituting goods and
local amenities across locations. So, if utility is to be kept constant as consumers
move from less costly to more costly areas, nominal wages must increase, but need do
so only at a decreasing rate. Consequently, it is common practice in labor and urban
economics research to endorse a method of partial cost of living adjustment which
uses cost of living as an explanatory variable rather than deflating the dependent
variable directly.
Population
As mentioned, auditee size is an important determinant of the effort needed for an
audit and the fees required (Palmrose, 1986). On the one hand, population is used to
control for auditee size, by various previous government studies on audit fees. On the
other hand, we use population as a control variable on dealing with the size of the
auditee’s headquarters. The Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) includes six
variables that directly influence audit fees and another variable that indirectly
influences fees through three other factors. The SEM approach concentrates on model
fit, based on standardized coefficient evaluation, soundness of fit statistics, and other
diagnostics. SEM provides a much richer analysis of the municipal audit environment,
incorporating the mediation processes (indirect effects) determined simultaneously in
the model. For example, population has both a substantial direct effect on audit fees
and an indirect effect on them because of client complexity (component units) and the
big four auditors. Population is used to capture relative client size. The log of
population (LPOP) is used in the multivariate analysis to control for skewness.
(McLelland & Giroux, 2008)
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From <http://www.census.gov/popest/data/index.html> we downloaded US-
population data for every county for the years 2000 and 2010 and then used the
method of linear interpolation to approximate the population for the period 2003-
2010.
Other demographic control variables
After controlling for the cost of living, we decided also to control for the average
wage7 for every US state and the housing cost8 for every five-digit ZIP code.
The average wage 9can be considered as a measure of prosperity of a country’s
inhabitants. A similar measure is GDP per capita, but there are components of the
GDP (such as the gross operating surplus, i.e., the companies’ savings, reinvestments,
or dividends paid to shareholders) which, of course, increase or decrease the GDP but
which do not directly contribute to the well-being of the country’s citizens.
We decided to control for as much demographics as we could in order to increase our
study’s accuracy. After controlling for demographics we have found that the
difference in audit fees paid by urban agglomerate firms, urban firms, and rural firms
lies in the different premiums charged in cities and in the country.
3.5. Audit fees and enforcement preferences of the Security Exchange
Commission
This part of our dissertation is motivated by Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) who
investigate whether a firm’s likelihood of committing a violation is influenced by the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement preferences.
We posit for the physical distance to SEC offices proxies for differences in their
awareness of SEC activities, based on recent findings that reveal the association
between geographic proximity and informational advantages. Our proxy for the
SEC’s resource constraints is based on a recent General Accounting Office (GAO)
report that evinces the belief of SEC officials on viewing traveling outside the SEC’s
geographic jurisdiction as a costly allocation of investigative resources (GAO, 2007).
7 http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm
8http://www.bestplaces.net/tools
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_average_wage
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So many SECs prefer conducting geographically closer investigations, due to being
less costly and more efficient. The latter argument incorporates the SEC’s ability to
know more about proximate firms rather than remote ones. Proximity enhances the
interaction between firms’ executives and SEC officials, since the former may provide
information to the SEC about potential misconduct. Also, the SEC detects violations
based on tips about financial reporting irregularities. Moreover, the awareness of the
employees of proximate firms for of the SEC and its detection policy is greater than
that of the employees of distant firms, and therefore is more likely to reveal potential
problems.
In other words, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) state that geographically proximate
counties to the SEC’s offices have low misreporting ratios. Closer to the SEC firms
rationally comply with the SEC’s preferences and avoid Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) violations. What is more, it is a common sense that
local cops have constrains and limitations to the resources needed to make arrests.
We obtain the latitude and longitude of SEC offices and counties from US Census
Bureau Gazetteer, in order to estimate the distance between the SEC offices and
counties. Although Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) consider both SEC offices and
regional offices when calculating distances, we want to focus our study mainly on the
distance between the SEC offices in Washington, DC and the firm’s headquarters
(WDCDIST). We want to test whether audit fees increase (decrease) with the distance
between the SEC offices and firms’ headquarters.
3.6. Audit fees and education requirements
The profession of accountancy throughout the world maintains certain requirements
for entry; commonly among these are education, experience, good moral standing,
and successful completion of a qualifying examination. In determining the optimal
mix and level of professional entry requirements, regulatory bodies must consider not
only the potential benefits of each requirement, but also the related costs to the
profession and to the public (Allen & Woodland, 2010).
The 150 hours education requirement was voted by the general membership of the
American Institute of Certificated Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1988 and was put
into effect for all new members after the year 2000. As of March 2007, only five
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states have not adopted a 150-hour requirement to sit for the CPA examination or to
obtain licensure (California, Colorado, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Vermont).
The AICPA (2007) offers this evaluation of the effects of increased education
requirements on audit fees: “Accounting firms are going to need to increase starting
salaries in order to attract top students into the profession. This is true even in the
absence of an increased education requirement. The phase-in period, usually
adopted, should enable firms to absorb the increased cost over a period of years. New
entrants who complete the requirement are expected to be more knowledgeable,
efficient and work with less supervision. It is expected that both time and staff size will
be reduced to offset increases in client costs.”
Coinciding with widespread adoption of the 150-hour education requirement in the
US were significant regulatory changes in response to financial scandals at the
beginning of the new millennium. These changes resulted in rapidly increasing audit
fees over the time period 2000–2010 (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009).
We use the 150-hour education requirement in the US and the audit services market
during the period 2003–2010 as the setting for our study. We want to compare audit
fees for observations across states with different lengths of time subsequent to the
implementation of additional education requirements based on Allen and Woodland
(2010) who found that audit fees increase as time passes after implementing
additional education requirements. The time effects of the 150-hour requirement
(LAGEDU150) are measured as the natural log of the number of years after
implementation plus one 10 and using the log form of the variable allows us to
interpret the coefficient as a percentage change.
3.7. Audit fees and auditor specialization
Viewed generally as a differentiated service, auditing exhibits substantial variation in
audit fees, even after controlling for such manifest factors as firm size and firm
complexity. Differentiation in audit services gives auditees an option over the level of
audit scrutiny, even within audits conducted by the same auditors. One significant
way that auditors differentiate their products is through specialization (Simunic &
Stein, 1987; Liu & Simunic, 2005). When an auditor specializes in a specific industry,
10The convention of adding one to the underlying number of years allows us to avoid taking the log of
zero in states that have not yet implemented the 150-hour requirement
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in certain sized groups, or in companies with similar risk profiles, or in other words,
when an auditor becomes a so-called industry specialist, it differentiates its products
from those of competitors who haven’t specialized (Simunic & Stein, 1987; Liu &
Simunic, 2005).
Recent findings from studies on audit fees indicate a fee-premium on auditor industry
specialization at either the municipal or the national level, and in some cases at both
levels. Since premiums like these demonstrate a higher willingness to pay for
services, most economists recognize them as indications that auditees value those
auditors who exhibit greater expertise in their industry. Mayhew and Wilkins (2003)
present auditor specialization as a form of differentiation, which leads not only to cost
reduction and greater efficiency, but also potentially to greater value to the auditee. In
the presence of successful differentiation between auditors and their competitors (i.e.,
possessing great market shares compared to their competitors), fee premiums can be
charged, but where they are unsuccessful in this, they need to offer discounts in order
to attract auditees. Auditing literature evinces benefits to specialist auditors, due to
efficient and low-cost audits. For example, Low (2004) highlights the flexibility and
velocity of specialist auditors on adjusting to moderations in audit programs inherited
from predecessor auditors.
Although most of the early research on specialization identifies specialists based on
national market share, numerous researches have turned to encounter leadership based
on local or city market share. Ferguson and Stokes (2002) evince the absence of
specialist premiums in Australia in the 1990s, at the national level. Francis, et al.
(2005) find evidence for a specialist premium, when the auditor specializes at both the
municipal and national levels in the US, and Francis, et al. (2005) suggest further that
a sufficient condition for a premium is likely to be the city-specific leadership alone.
Ferguson et al. (2003) maintain, though, that leadership at both the national and
municipal levels is needed to warrant a fee premium. The overall findings of agency
theory, thus, permit no predictions as to whether specialist auditors should charge a
fee premium. A meta-analysis conducted by Knechel, et al. (2006), suggest that
auditor specialization plays a significant role in three studies out of nine.
In this dissertation, we use county market share as a measure of auditor specialization,
and we call an auditor a leader at the county level when that auditor’s market share
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accounts for most audit services within a given auditee county. The variable
LEAD_COUNTY takes the value of 1 when the auditor’s market share (i.e., the ratio
of that auditor’s fees to total audit fees charged in the county) is the highest in the
county and it takes the value of 0 otherwise.
3.8. Additional control variables
The size of the auditee is a very crucial variable in explaining the level of audit fees
and is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Company size matters
because large companies’ auditors need to spend a lot of time and effort scrutinizing
data and information (Simunic, 1980, Firth, 1985, Chan, et al., 1993, Pong &
Whittington, 1994, and Simon, 1995). “The more complex is the auditee, the deeper
and larger the tests that an auditor has to conduct in order to form his
opinion”(Cameran, 2005).
Other variables commonly included in the audit pricing model are the complexity of
the auditee company as well as audit risk (Chan, et al., 1993). Our study uses as
proxies for audit risk Return on Assets (ROA), Net Income/Loss (LOSS), and BETA.
ROA gives an idea of the efficiency of management in using assets to generate
earnings, and ROA is also an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its
total assets.11 LOSS is a dummy variable. If a firm of the sample has the last fiscal
year made a loss, then LOSS equals 1, otherwise LOSS equals 0. BETA (also called
financial elasticity or correlated relative volatility) measures the sensitivity of asset
returns to market returns, its systematic risk, its non-diversifiable risk, or market
risk.12Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) have shown a negative association, somewhat
weakly, between audit fees and Beta.
A cause for higher audit fees can be the complexity of the auditee, because more time
is needed to perform the audit and because fee per hour is set higher. An indicator of
auditee complexity used in this dissertation is the natural logarithm of the number of
business segments (SEG), but particular balance sheet composition measures have
also been used as an indicator of auditee complexity, as discussed previously.
11 http://www.investopedia.com
12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beta
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Also important to determining the level of audit fees is audit risk, but the relation
between the two is much more complex. We can define the audit risk as the risk of
observing misstatements in financial statements after the audit is completed, thus
resulting in the issuing of an unqualified opinion (Loebbecke, 1994). For one, the
higher the audit risk, the more numerous the audit tests which have to be run; and two,
a higher fee is charged as a compensation for undertaking a higher risk of audit failure
(Brinn, et al., 1994). Even without audit failure, some risk of loss is always present. In
this dissertation, in order to measure audit risk, we use current ratio (CUR) and quick
ratio (QUICK) as measurements of the liquidity of the auditee, that is, the auditee’s
capacity to serve its debt. (Since we noticed a high correlation between these liquidity
measures, we decided to use QUICK ratio as a proxy for audit risk.) The better an
auditee can serve its debt, the lower its financial risk. Audit fees also seem to increase
as liability exposure increases, and the risk of bankruptcy looms (Simunic & Stein,
1996). Signs of financial distress in the auditee increase the likelihood that all losses
must be paid by the auditor in the case of insolvency. As a proxy of the auditee’s
financial distress we use leverage (LEV), where it is defined as the amount of debt
being used to finance a firm's assets. Debt has a positive impact on audit fees because
high levels of debt make bankruptcy more likely and thus the auditee riskier (Beaver,
1966, Ohlson, 1980). Auditor firms tackle this risk by raising audit fees (Jubb, et al.,
1996).
Another determinant of audit fees is auditor size. In this dissertation, we use the
dummy variable AUD to show whether a company’s auditor is a Big Four or not (Gul
& Tsui, 1998). According to a survey conducted by the Financial Executives Research
Foundation (FERF), “88% of public company respondents used the Big Four
(Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers) for their audits
compared with only 36% of private company respondents”.13 Most economists think
that high fees are demanded by large auditors, also called big premium prices, either
because of market power or because of their brand name (Basioudis & Fifi, 2004).
The research has demonstrated that auditor size affects fees in three ways: through
product differentiation, through non-competitive pricing, and through economies of
scale (Anderson & Zeghal, 1994). Some studies evidence that audit fees and auditor
13 http://www.vrl-financial-news.com/accounting/intl-accounting-bulletin/issues/iab-2010/iab-470-
471/us-audit-fees-stabilised-in-20.aspx
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size have a negative relation, due to economies of scale in the cost of the largest
auditors (Palmrose, 1986). But when a positive relation between auditor size and audit
pricing can be demonstrated, other studies highlight the differences between the small
and large auditee market segments (Carson, et al., 2004).
Audit fees have been shown to be negatively associated with a change of auditor firm
(AUDC) during the previous year. Several studies suggest that companies wanting to
reduce audit fees should change auditor firms (Eichenseher & Shields, 1983; Johnson
& Lys , 1990), but other studies argue that a change of firm serves only the purpose of
obtaining additional services (Burton & Roberts, 1967; Bedingfield & Loeb, 1974).
Some even suggest that a voluntary change of firm is part of the search for an auditor
ready to sign an audit report in line with the preferences of company management, so-
called opinion shopping (Cameran, et al., 2008). In this dissertation, we search for a
relationship between audit fees and change of auditor firm by setting AUDC to 1 if
there has been change of firm in the past year and by setting AUDC to 0 otherwise.
The term going concern (GCON) means that an economic entity will continue to
operate in the near future (usually longer than the next 12 months) as long as it
possesses or generates enough resources to operate. Before issuing a report, an auditor
firm is required to consider whether or not the auditee is a going concern. If the
auditee is, the auditor firm will not modify the report in any way and will issue an
unqualified opinion. But if the auditor firm has reason to believe that the auditee is not
a going concern or will soon not be a going concern, then it is required to include
either before or after the opinion paragraph of the audit report a note explaining the
situation. This note is often referred to as the going-concern disclosure and the
opinion it modifies, as unqualified modified opinion.14 Since the number of reporting
errors is lower if surviving companies avoid going-concern opinions and higher if
failing companies avoid going-concern opinions, we hypothesize that audit fees are
higher in cases of unqualified modified opinions, and we test this hypothesis by
setting the dummy variable GCON to 1 when there is a going concern disclosure and
by setting GCON to 0 otherwise.
Restatement (RES) is the term used for the revision and publication of one or more of
a company's previous financial statements. Restatements become mandatory when it
14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auditor%27s_report#Qualified_Opinion_report
Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence
21
can be shown that a previous statement contains some material inaccuracy, which can
fountain from accounting errors, nonconformance with generally accepted accounting
principles, fraud, misrepresentation, and simple clerical errors. Restatements may
cause a stock’s price to decline, as a result of shaking investors’ and stakeholders
confidence.15 The link between low audit quality and financial statement restatements
is straight forward. When an auditor firm issues an unqualified opinion, it affirms that
the financial statements as a whole are presented fairly in all material respects.
Potential restatements and alternates by material amounts in the financial statements
that could have been detected and reported by the auditor, indicate an erroneous
original audit opinion (Woodland & Reynolds, 2003). Such restatements types imply
that a poor quality of the performed audit. Mixed, limited empirical evidence (as well
as our own intuition) tells us to expect economic dependence to be related to the
likelihood of restatement in a positive way.
In the US audit market, where firms are expending a significant portion of their
revenues for litigation purposes, litigation (LIT) against auditors is also a concern.
Firms’ propensity to resort to litigation differs from country to country, so we expect
loss exposure to increase in those countries where the propensity to resort to litigation
is greater.
The fiscal year (FIS), also called financial year and budget year, is referred to a
twelve-month period, which is engaged on calculating annual financial statements in
businesses and other organizations. In many jurisdictions, regulatory laws regarding
accounting and taxation mandate the issuing of such statements once a year but do not
require that the fiscal year be a calendar year (i.e., 1 January through 31 December).
Fiscal years vary from business to business and from country to country. Fiscal year
may also refer to the year used for income tax reporting. In this dissertation, we set
the dummy variable FIS to 1 when the fiscal year ends in December and to 0
otherwise. 16
We also control for non-audit fees by account for their natural logarithm (LNONF).
Theories linking audit fees, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals are, at best, partial.
For example, theories supporting the economies of scope evidence that the
15http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/restatement.asp#ixzz21itaMBA8
16 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year
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connections between audit and non-audit fees (Antle & Demski, 1991; Beck, et al.,
1988 and Simunic, 1984) result in an economic bond between the auditor and the
auditee. Also, bargaining theories (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991)support that the
characteristics of financial reports, such as abnormal accruals, and accounting firm
fees are closely related. And basic economic theory would assume that the
acquisitions of services as well as the productive effects of services operate according
to supply and demand. In the audit literature is also examined the significance of the
coefficient (be it positive or negative) on NAF. On the one hand a positive coefficient
indicates that non-audit services have determined the economies of scope, while on
the other, when a negative coefficient is present, the audit fees may have been
determined by pricing games.
In this dissertation, we account for the stock exchange that a company is listed to by
including the NYSE control variable. Coulton, et al. (2001) examined a sample of 614
industrial companies listed on the ASX in 1998 and found that the level of audit fees
and the existence of an audit committee are positively correlated. Moreover, New
York Stock Exchange Committee suggested a stricter framework for the amended
listed standards that a corporation must comply with to get listed in NYSE. (NYSE,
2002).
The SEC has the aim of adopting a more active role in monitoring the integrity of
company financial statements, overseeing relationships between auditees and auditors,
ensuring the independence of outside auditors, and monitoring companies’ internal
controls as well as their compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. More
specifically, the SEC is obliged to (NYSE, 2002):
1. “require public accountants to be regulated by a new private-sector
organization governed and funded independently of the accounting industry”;
2. “require companies, in all public or shareholder communications, to report
complete financial information based on Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP), before any reference to pro forma or adjusted financial
information”; and
3. “exercise more active oversight of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) to improve the quality of GAAP and the speed of FASB actions”.
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We are inclined to believe that the above mentioned requirements may affect the audit
pricing policy of auditors, since a stricter monitoring framework has to be complied
with. We expect a company’s audit fees to increase when that company is listed on
the NYSE, or in other words, audit fees will go up the more strictly the auditor is
monitored.
4. Eleven Hypotheses
Although previous studies have revealed much about how audit fees are arrived at,
our study is unique in the broad range of variables we test for correlation to audit fees.
Our focus, it can be said, lies on the real reasons why audit fees in the USA are what
they are.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Taking table 1 as our point of departure, we will now make eleven hypotheses
intended to explain the correlation between audit fees and most of these variables.
Product market competition
One thing we want our study to test is the correlation between audit fees and product
market competition. We consider an audit fee to be a specific and measurable agency
cost, and so we ask whether increased competition in the product market brings about
lower agency costs meaning lower audit fees. At the same time, we know that agency
costs will hardly be reduced to zero.
Theoretical and empirical analyses by Baggs and De Bettignes (2007)indicate that
managerial effort is affected by competition, with the latter having both a direct
pressure effect and an agency effect on the former. Baggs and De Bettignes (2007) are
able to demonstrate a significant inverse correlation between how high the agency
cost is and how intense the competition is. Karuna (2007) gives empirical evidence
for the variables product substitutability and market size to show how, on the one
hand, they correlate positively with the incentives given managers and, on the other
hand, they correlate negatively with entry costs. According to Raith (2003), most
economists assume that product market competition gives managers better incentives,
which, in turn, lead to the higher levels of productive efficiency. Finally, Jagannathan
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and Srinivasan (1999)consider product market competition as a force that both
disciplines managers and also discourages wasteful expenditure.
Leventis, et al. (2011) show for existing markets that the extent of product market
competition is inversely correlated with audit fee and audit duration. They explain
that reductions in the monitoring costs of the audit are compensated for when
competitors monitor more closely management. In other words, where product market
competition is relatively high, owners of the auditee can rely more heavily on market
forces to monitor the activities of management. Thus we arrive at our first hypothesis:
H1: All other things being equal, high audit fees will correlate negatively with
competition in product markets.
Alignment with the auditee preferences
From the research we are able to conclude both that auditees have diverse auditor
preferences due to differentiation in terms of auditee characteristics, such as industry,
and that differ in terms of net benefits gained from audits, due to existence of
different types of auditors. The market location is captured by the incumbent auditor’s
location relative to the auditee (auditor–auditee industry alignment). This implies that
incumbent auditors’ market power is partially derived from industry specialization
(Numan & Willekens, 2012) because an auditor’s competitive position will improve
as its differentiation strategy brings it within the auditee’s auditor preferences. In
other words, greater or lesser alignment with the auditee betters or worsens,
respectively, an auditor’s competitive advantage. We come, then, to our second
hypothesis:
H2: When potential market power effects are controlled for through the HHI, audit
fees will increase as the incumbent auditor’s differentiation strategy aligns it with the
auditee’s auditor preferences.
The length of time after the implementation of the education requirement
Freshmen of accountancy who were beginning in the year 2000 were required in some
US states to complete 150 hours of study before they would be admitted to the CPA
exam. Allen and Woodland (2010) examine whether this additional education
requirement to enter the accounting profession lead to higher costs for auditees. Using
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the 150-hour education requirement, they find that corporations headquartered in
states that have implemented this requirement pay more in audit fees than
corporations in states that have not. Additionally, they find that audit fees increase as
time passes after the implementation of this requirement.
In this dissertation, we ask whether there is any correlation between audit pricing and
the time passing since the implement of the 150-hour education requirement in 2000.
Audit fees are for the auditors a matter of supply and demand, and the 150-hour
education requirement has shortened the supply of new professionals because, as
studies have proven, the number of candidates passing the CPA exam has been in
steady decline since 2000. So, we expect an increasing effect on audit fees over time.
Although the research here is sparse, we attempt this third hypothesis:
H3: After controlling for other audit fee determinants, we expect a positive
correlation between high audit fees and the length of time after the implementation of
the 150-hour education requirement.
The Distance between firm headquarters and Washington SEC Office
Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) find that the number of SEC enforcement actions whittles
away with the distance between a firm’s headquarters and the SEC offices in
Washington, D.C., has led us to test for a possible correlation between audit fees and
the distance of a firm’s headquarters from the SEC offices. Probably because of
budget constraints and an information advantage, the SEC seem to be more likely to
investigate firms located closer to their own offices, so we expect audit fees charged
to firms located closer to the SEC to be lower when compared to those charged to
firms located farther. Since employees of audit firms close to Washington, D.C., will
be better informed about the SEC and their detection policy, the probability of
accounting irregularities resulting in material misstatements of financial reports
should be lower, which would mean lower fees, as well. Thus, our fourth hypothesis
is:
H4: Audit fees increase with the distance between a firm’s headquarters and the SEC
offices in Washington, D.C.
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Size of city where auditee headquarters
A great many studies look at the role of urban agglomeration in firm innovation and
productivity. For instance, strong positive correlations have been demonstrated
between size of city, employee skills level, degree of innovation, firm productivity,
and wages for low-level highly-skilled workers (Francis, et al., 2012). Not one study,
though, has pursued the question how urban agglomeration affects audit fees;
therefore, in the absence of prior evidence we are unable to hypothesize for the sign of
the relation between size of the city where the auditee firm headquarters and audit
fees.
H5: When the cost of living index and other demographics are controlled for,
important correlations should exist between the size of the city where the auditee is
headquartered and audit pricing.
Size of auditee
Important studies have found that large-sized companies claim a great deal of the
auditor’s time and effort because such large amounts of data have to be tested and
analyzed and because detailed audit procedures have to be run in order to check for
material misstatements (Cameran, 2005). The variable that is widely used as a
measure of the size of the auditee is total assets. This brings us to our sixth
hypothesis:
H6: The larger the auditee gets, the higher will be the audit fees.
Audit risk
In this dissertation, we use the following variables as proxies for audit risk: ROA,
leverage, market-based risk (Beta), Market to Book value of assets, a loss dummy
variable, quick ratio, a going concern dummy, and a restatement dummy. Although
Beta and the short-term capital structure (quick ratio) are generally assumed to be
negatively correlated with audit fees, we make this, our seventh, hypothesis:
H7: The correlation between high audit fees and audit risk is positive and significant.
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Organizational complexity of auditee
The proxy we use for the organizational complexity of the auditee is the natural
logarithm of a firm’s number of business segments. In accordance with the research,
we make our eighth hypothesis:
H8: The correlation between high audit fees and the number of business segments of
the auditee is positive and significant.
Risk of litigation
Litigation against auditors has increased dramatically in recent years. Taylor & Simon
(1999) expect that, other being things equal, higher risk of litigation will lead to
higher audit fees. But Auditors do have a number of ways that they can offset the risk
of litigation, and these include the improving of audit quality and planning, the
increasing of audit fees, and the issuing of modified opinions. Auditors also have the
options of becoming more selective when taking new auditees and of withdrawing
from high-risk engagements (Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997).
In this dissertation, where we find that an auditor spends a significant portion of its
revenues for purposes of litigation, we use a dummy variable of 1, otherwise this
variable equals 0. This gives us our ninth hypothesis:
H9: As risk of litigation increases, so too will audit fees.
Size of auditor
In order to verify that Big Four auditors in the USA have shared pricing behavior, as
evidenced in many other countries (Cobbin, 2002), we measure the size of the auditor
with a dummy variable. Findings indicate that firm size has a considerable positive
impact on the fees for audit services, that is, the larger an auditor is, and the higher are
its fees. Economists explain this in two different ways (Cameran, 2005). First, Big
Four auditors demand higher fees on the power of their reputations (Moizer, 1997).
Second, Big Four auditors have tremendous market power, so they can act as a cartel
and charge higher fees (Palmrose, 1986). This fact is also confirmed by the findings
of the Antitrust Authority investigation. Our tenth hypothesis states:
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H10: As an auditor becomes larger and approaches the Big Four, its fees will go up,
too.
Auditor specialization
We can imply that industry specialization is a dimension of audit quality (De Angelo,
1981,Craswell, et al., 1995). In the research into auditing there are two competing
theories that explain how auditor specialization affects fees. The first theory takes
auditor specialization for a differentiation strategy that, if valued by auditees, leads to
higher fees. The second theory also sees auditor specialization creating economies of
scale since audit production costs go down when many similar auditees are being
serviced. But if production efficiency is not outweighed by higher profit margins (e.g.,
because of competitive pressure), then some cost savings will be transferred to the
auditee creating fee discounts. From this the second theory concludes that auditor
specialization creates differentiated products of higher quality as well as production
efficiencies. If the second theory is correct, the observed net effect on fees will
depend on which factor dominates, and so we test our eleventh hypothesis in null
form:
H11: Auditor specialization cannot be correlated with audit fees in any significant
way.
5. Research Design
5.1. Sample and data collecting procedure
Our dataset on audit fees was downloaded from the Audit Analytics database. The
initial dataset underwent quality tests: missing values were found out and both non-
US firms and private firms were deleted. A drop in the number of companies from
15,743 in 2003 to 12,464 in 2010 brought with it a decline in the data available per
company per year, and so full data was obtained for 4,039 companies. For the
financial statement data we turned at first to the Thomson one database but later found
much more useful the North America Compustat database because it specializes in
data from Northern America and Canada. Once again, the initial dataset underwent
quality tests. In the end, full data for the variables and relevant time period was
obtained for 1,302 companies.
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We must mention that our sample comprises firms from various sectors, that is, firms
with different SIC codes as derived from both the Audit Analytics database and five-
digit ZIP codes. Using these two sources enabled us to check if auditors preferred
certain pricing methods according to the auditee’s business segment and geographic
location. Table 2 presents the composition of our sample in terms of SIC-2 codes. As
we observe more than the half of our sample is concentrated among 8 different
primary SIC-2 codes.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In order to calculate the variable for product market competition using the HHI, we
downloaded the net sales and the primary SIC-2 code for all US companies available
in the Compustat database. We obtained data for a total of 28,472 companies,
including both private and public US companies.
We chose to use data from the years 2003 through 2010 because this period appeared
to us to be a stable one. Studies have shown that immediately after the introduction of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act pinpoint there was an increase both in audit fees, especially for
higher risk auditees (Griffin & Lont, 2007, Asthana, et al., 2009) and in switching
activity (i.e., dismissals and resignations) (Griffin & Lont, 2005Ettredge, et al., 2007).
The MSA status for each firm in our sample was determined through a four-step
process. First, we used Compustat to locate each firm’s headquarters and then
obtained latitude and longitude for the headquarters from the US Census Bureau’s
Gazetteer city-state files. Second, we downloaded from the 2010 US Census a table
providing estimates of population for MSAs and the rankings of the MSAs. In this
table we also found a code for each MSA assigning it to a Core Based Statistical Area
(CBSA). Third, we decided whether an MSA was an Urban Agglomerate (UA) area
or an Urban (U) area. Out of 366 MSAs, 51 could be described as either UA or U.
And fourth, we applied the methodology from (Kedia & Rajgopal, 2011), as detailed
in chapter Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε. above, to
categorize the remaining 315 areas.
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After characterizing all MSAs, we faced the problem of matching each five-digit ZIP
code to its corresponding characterization. We were fortunate enough to find a file17
containing information for each ZIP code and its respective CBSA code. Since the file
contained more than 2 million records, we turned to MS Access to read its full
contents.
Our calculations show that 41% of the firms in our sample are UA firms, 36% U, and
3% R. The remaining 20% are firms which are headquartered in a MSA but do not fit
any of the three categories UA, U, or R.
5.2. The Empirical Model
The core purpose of our study is to identify the determinants of audit fees for all US
firms—this is population to be studied—by analyzing the available random sample of
1,302 US firms. By random sample we mean a sample in which each individual item
in the population is equally likely to be drawn.
The population regression function calculates the relationship between the sample
observations and an error term. It is normally written thus:= + + , = 1,2, …… ,
This equation splits the value of y into two components: the fitted value from the
model and an error term ∼ . . . ( , ) independent from . Since we are
using the Ordinary Least Squares we needed a model that is linear within the
parameters ( and ), that is, a model in which these parameters are not multiplied
together, divided, squared, or cubed (Brooks, 2008).
Controlling for industry and year effects, we summarize our model thus:= + + + + _ +_ + + + + ++ + + + + ++ + + + + +
17 The file that contains each CBSA code per five-digit ZIP code was obtained from
http://www.census.gov/ population/metro /data/other.html
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+ + + + _ +_ + + + +∑ + ∑ + j
Where:
β0 = Intercept
β1 toβ102 = Coefficients of slope parameters
LAF = Natural logarithm of Audit fees
LNONF = Natural logarithm of non-audit fees
COMP = Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the product market based onauditee's revenue in the form of sales
COMP_AF =
Herfindahl concentration index per audit market. An audit market
is defined as a two-digit SIC industry in a US Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA, US Census Bureau definition)
AL_CLNT = Fees an auditor generates in a 2-digit SIC industry as apercentage of the total fees generated by an auditor in an MSA
NAT_SHARE = Fees an auditor generates in a 2-digit SIC industry as apercentage of the total fees generated by and auditor nationwide
LAGEDU150 = Natural logarithm of the number of years after implementation ofthe 150-hour requirement plus 1
WDCDIST = the distance of firms' headquarters and the SEC office inWashington DC
UA = Dummy coded 1 if the firm is part of a Urban Agglomerate area,0 otherwise
U = Dummy coded 1 if the firm is part of a Urban area, 0 otherwise
R = Dummy coded 1 if the firm is part of a Rural area, 0 otherwise
LSIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets at the year-end
QUICK = Quick ratio, measured as the current assets without inventories tocurrent liabilities
ROA = Return on assets, measured as the ratio of income beforeextraordinary items to total assets
LEV = Leverage ratio, measured as total debt to total assets
BETA = Market risk, relationship between stock volatility and marketvolatility
LOSS = Dummy coded 1 if the firms net income in prior year is negative,or 0 otherwise
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MB = Market to book value of assets
LNSEG = Natural logarithm of number of segments of the auditee
FIS = Dummy coded 1 if fiscal year end is in December, 0 otherwise
LIT = Dummy coded 1 if the auditor is spending a significant portion ofits revenues for litigation purposes, 0 otherwise
AUDC = Dummy coded 1 if auditor changed compared to prior year, 0otherwise
AUD = Dummy coded 1 if the firm’s auditor is a big-4 auditor, 0otherwise
GCON = Dummy coded 1 if the firm has a going concern qualification, 0otherwise
RES = Dummy coded 1 if there is a financial statement restatement, 0otherwise
NYSE = Dummy coded 1 if there is the auditee is listed in the New YorkStock Exchange, 0 otherwise
LEAD_COUNTY= Dummy coded 1 if the firm’s auditor is a leader in the county, 0otherwise
LAVG_WAGE = Natural logarithm of the average wage by state
LHOME = Average housing cost for every zip code
LVCOST = Cost of living per zip code
LCPOP = Natural logarithm of population size per county
ε = Error term
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6. Empirical Results and Discussion
In this chapter, we provide descriptive statistics on the dependent and explanatory
variables and we point up the correlations among them. Also, we present the
methodology we used in dealing with heteroscedasticity and a regression analysis
including the findings of our research.
6.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
The descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables our study
considers are shown in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Panel A reports the statistical properties of the regressand LAF for the years 2003
through 2010. The table makes plain that the overall score of the natural logarithm of
audit fees takes values between a minimum of +9 and a maximum of +18. This means
that in our sample the minimum fee charged to an auditee is $8,103 a year and the
maximum fee $65,660 a year. Since the overall median is 14 and the overall mean
13.8574, we observe that the distribution of LAF is skewed slightly left and is slightly
flat near the mean (skewness = -0.17 and kurtosis = 2.8).18 The overall LAF score
does not vary much over time. These small values of skewness and kurtosis come
from our using the natural logarithm of audit fees.
Panel B gives descriptive statistics for the causal variables. No variable is normally
distributed, and the competition in the audit market is platykurtic, but in the product
market leptokurtic. In order to determine the confidence interval of the standard
deviations among the variables, we found the value for and calculated as
follows:19
( − 1) 2
2
2 , 1 , ( − 1) 221 2 , 1 ]
18 The kurtosis of a normally distributed random variable depends on the formula used. The formula
used by Stata does not subtract 3, as, which makes the value for a normal distribution equal to 3.
19 http://www.fourmilab.ch/rpkp/experiments/analysis/chiCalc.html
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(where n is the number of observations, in our case 9521, and α is the probability of
observing a certain value, in our case 0.05). Our conclusion is that the dispersion of
most variables is acceptable.
The Pearson Pairwise correlation coefficients for all of the major variables used in our
study are shown in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In order to test the null hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between two
variables (ρ=0) against the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant correlation
(ρ≠0), we calculate the for each of the correlation coefficients and compare
them with the critical values ( % , % , % ). We reject the null
hypothesis when │ │ > at a certain level of significance. Table 4
makes plain that most correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level, such as
those between alignment client and competition in the audit market (ρ=0.8186),
between urban agglomerate and cost of living (ρ=0.426), and between the number of
years after the implementation of the 150-hour education requirement and auditee size
(ρ=0.0715). There is a significant negative correlation at the 5% level between auditor
size and rural (ρ=-0.0212) and between NYSE and leverage (ρ=-0.0257). “No
bivariate correlation exceeds the conventional threshold of 0.8” (Gujarati & Porter,
2009), and so multicollinearity is not a serious problem. Another indicator of
multicollinearity is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), the amounts of which for the
variables of our study are shown in Table 5. None of these values exceeds the critical
value of 10. From this we conclude that there is no correlation among the explanatory
variables (Gujarati & Porter, 2009) and, likewise, expect multicollinearity not to cause
significant statistical difficulties.
6.2. Dealing with heteroscedasticity
We also performed heteroscedasticity tests to determine whether the variance of
standard errors in our model remains constant across all observations, which is the
basic assumption for homoscedasticity. We tested for homoscedasticity using the
Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg tests and found heteroscedasticity in the ways the
variance of standard errors in our model changed.
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We took the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) approach to correct our model for
heteroscedasticity. We calculated a weight defined as 1 divided by the fitted variance
of the error terms, = 1/ and then multiplied that weight by each variable of the
initial Ordinary Least Squares model, including the constant term (Ramanathan,
2002). As Ramanathan (2002) suggests, one of these three denominators can be used
as alternative proxies for reaching the optimal weight:
1. the fitted values of the residuals squared ( )
2. the absolute fitted values of the residuals (| |)
3. the logarithm of squared residuals (ln )
After constructing separately three different WLS equations for each weight, we
regressed once again their residuals against all independent variables in order to apply
the Lagrange Multiplier test for heteroscedasticity:R ∗ n ~ X
(Where R is the coefficient of determination, n the number of observations, and p the
number of coefficients).
For each of the three different WLS equations we obtained LM values, respective to
the above list, of 1515.743, 3566.567, and 1378.641. Since the Chi-square critical
value (X = 69.126) is smaller than the LM values, we say that the WLS procedure
does not correct heteroscedasticity in our model.
We read that the Davidson and MacKinnon standard errors correction tends to
produce better results when a model is highly heteroskedastic (Davidson &
MacKinnon, 1993), so we turned to this method to account for heteroscedasticity in
our model. The Davidson and MacKinnon standard errors correction has been widely
used by research into the field of accounting (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007,Bartley, et
al., 2007, Giroux and Jones, 2007, Gul, 2006, McMeeking, et al., 2006). Furthermore,
the method produces confidence intervals that tend to be more conservative than
usual, as this formula demonstrates:
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= (1 − ℎ )
6.3. Regression analysis
Although the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix provide some evidence
for the average level of and the univariate relations between the variables, we employ
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis and, as the dependent variable, the
natural logarithm of audit fees in order to find their joint effects. The results of the
OLS regression analysis, more specifically the coefficients, their standard errors, the
t-statistic, associated p-values, and the 95% confidence interval of the coefficients, are
all shown in Table 5.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Since all 9,521 observations in our data set were employed in the regression analysis,
we can say that none of the variables had missing values. More specifically, the
regression F-statistic (509.62) with a p-value of zero suggests that the slope
coefficients are jointly significantly different from 0. The model succeeds in
explaining all of the variability of LAF around its mean value ( = 82.93%), which
proves how well our model fits the data. All coefficients are statistically significant,
except for the few statistically indistinguishable from zero even at 10% significance
level (particularly those in NAT_SHARE, R, LEV, AUDC, NYSE variables). And
although the intercept is insignificant, “there are good statistical reasons for always
retaining the constant” (Brooks, 2008).
The outcomes of our regression analysis help close a gap in the research on the
determinants of audit fees. In accordance our H1, product market competition is found
to be significant at 5% with a positive coefficient. The positive and statistically
significant relationship between audit fees and competition in the product market is
not consistent with studies such as (Leventis, et al., 2011, Baggs & De Bettignes,
2007 and Chan, et al., 2004), which argue that as competition intensifies, audit fees
decrease. But theories20 are out there which claim that product market competition
does affect audit fees and that it does so in two directions. First, firms in a more
20Wang, Y., Product Market Competition and Audit Fees (23 October 2010). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697685 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1697685
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competitive industry are less likely to manipulate financial statements because
competition plays the role of corporate governance and mitigates agency problems. So
it can be said that product market competition decreases audit risk, which means that
audit fees become lower with product market competition through the channel of
audit risk. Second, firms in a more competitive industry face more liquidity risk and
distress risk, and since higher product market competition means higher auditor
litigation risk, it can be said that product market competition increases business risk
and that audit fees increase with product market competition through the channel of
business risk.
Such disparities in the research force us to reject our H1 because, as yet, it is
impossible to tell for certain what effect competition has on audit fees.
One important thing that we find is the strong positive correlation between audit fees
and non-audit fees. As also shown in numerous studies, e.g., (Kida, 1980, Francis and
Krishnan, 1999, Palmrose, 1986 and Beatty, 1993), where auditees are provided with
more non-audit services, higher audit fees are charged. The significant coefficient
LNONF makes us think that non-audit services create economies of scope.
Also important is our finding that audit fees change with the degree of alignment
between the incumbent auditor’s differentiation strategy and an auditee’s preferences.
The auditor-auditee alignment variable (ALN_CLNT) is our main variable for
measuring the competition in an audit market, and our control variable COMP_AF is
negative and significant, as predicted by previous studies. The coefficient for the
alignment client is positive and statistically significant at the conventional 1% level,
so we can say, like Numan and Willekens (2012) that the closer aligned are an
auditee’s preferences and the auditor’s differentiation choice, the stronger will be the
competitive position of the auditor. Thus, our H2 proves true: as the audit market
becomes more competitive, audit fees increase.
Regarding the length of time after the implementation of the 150-hour education
requirement, the coefficient for LAGEDU150 is positive and significant at the 1%
level and the sign is consistent with previous research (Allen & Woodland, 2010), so
a one unit increase in LAGEDU150 corresponds to a 0.0358 unit increase in the
predicted value of LAF. This finding corroborates our H3, namely that the length of
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time after the implementation of the 150-hour education requirement is positively
correlated with higher audit fees.
Our results also suggest, as we expected from Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), a
significant positive correlation between high audit fees and the distance of auditee
headquarters from the SEC offices (WDCDIST). Thus, our H4 proves true.
Francis, et al. (2012), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and John, et al. (2011) find strong
positive correlations between size of city where the firm is headquartered and three
variables, respectively: CEO compensation, lending relationship, and corporate
payout policy. The positive correlation between high audit fees and all the
demographics we selected (LHOME, AVG_WAGE, LPOP, LVCOST) proves correct
our argument that audit fees are higher in U and UA areas. We draw especial attention
to the demographics the cost of living per five-digit ZIP code (LVCOST) and the
average wage per US state (AVG_WAGE) because not only do they correlated
positively with high audit fees at the conventional level of 1%, but also their
coefficients are higher compared to the other demographics. The coefficients for UA
and U are positive and significant while R is not significantly related to audit fees
(P>0.1). We can say, then, that higher audit fees are charged to UA and U firms while
lower fees cannot be said to be charged to R firms, and so our H5 cannot be rejected.
In line with other important studies, we are able to amass evidence for a positive
significant relationship at 1% significance level between auditee size and high audit
fees. A one-unit increase in LSIZE corresponds to a 0.415 point increase in the
predicted value of the overall LAF score. Our H6 is proven true.
Our results point to a correlation between high audit fees and the major determinants
used as proxies for audit risk. One coefficient excepted here is the LEV, which is
insignificant even at 10% significance level. When posing our H7, we expected
negative coefficients for QUICK and BETA, and the quick ratio did come out
negative, but BETA came out positive. Our H7 is a general hypothesis for audit risk
including many variables, so if at least one variable coefficient does not correlate
significantly with audit fees, the hypothesis cannot be accepted.
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Our results indicate that the coefficient for LNSEG, as a proxy for auditee’s
organizational complexity, is positive and significant at 1% significance level, and so
our H8 cannot be rejected.
The coefficient for the litigation risk is positive, significant, and in accordance with
the findings of previous studies, so our H9 proves true.
Not only auditee size is positively correlated with high audit fees but auditor size is,
too, and the regression results show that Big Four auditors charge higher fees when
compared to other auditors. Thus, our H10 proves true.
Finally, the regression output verifies that there is a significant correlation between
high audit fees and auditor’s industry specialization (LEAD_COUNTY) at the county
level, which proves our H11. With this we hope to clarify an issue that the research
has handled only inconclusively.
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7. Conclusion
Our study has sought, within the framework of the spatial competition theory
(Hotelling, 1929), to answer the question whether auditors choose to specialize in
certain industries so as to gain an advantage in the price competition operating in their
market. Our study complements previous research on audit pricing and industry
specialization in many important ways.
First, we have verified just how important product market competition is to the
pricing of audit services. Contrary to expectations raised by the research, we have
found a positive correlation between high audit fees and competition between auditees
(i.e., product market competition), which result accords with the finding that  product
market competition increases business risk and that business risk, in turn, raises audit
fees (Wang, 2010).
Second, our findings accord with previous studies in their use of those variables
widely used as proxies for audit risk and the organizational complexity of auditee.
Third, we have shown how audit fees have steadily increased since 2000, the when
the 150-hour education requirement for the CPA exam was first implemented.
Fourth, we have provided evidence that audit fees increase the farther an auditee’s
headquarters is located from the SEC offices in Washington, D.C. Our explanation of
this fact is that SEC enforcement actions become rarer with distance from
Washington, D.C. because the SEC wants to allocate its investigative resources most
efficiently and because proximate firms are more likely to be aware of the SEC and its
detection policy.
Fifth, our findings show how audit fees are positively and significantly correlated to
auditor industry specialization at the county level. Auditor industry specialists charge
higher audit fees than their non-specialists peers, and what is more, our results from
regression analysis show that Big Four auditors charge higher audit fees than non-Big
Four auditors.
Sixth, as we predicted in our H5, important correlations do exist between the size of
the city where the auditee is headquartered and audit pricing when certain
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demographics are controlled for. The fact that we have found here a significant
positive correlation indicates that higher fees are charged to Urban Agglomerate and
Urban firms. Although earlier studies have found a strong positive relationship
between size of city, on the one hand, and employee skills level, degree of innovation,
firm productivity, and wages for low-level highly-skilled workers, on the other hand,
not one study provides evidence for the effects of urban agglomeration on audit fees.
And seventh, we test for spatial price competition in the audit market. Since we do not
assume that audit markets are perfectly competitive, our findings show how an
auditor’s competitive position becomes stronger, the closer aligned that auditor’s
differentiation choices are to the auditee’s preferences. Moreover, controlling for the
competition in the audit market, we find that audit fees are negatively related to audit
market competition.
Future research might test the spatial competition hypothesis developed in our study
by using alternative measures of the auditor–auditee fit. For example, auditor
specialization might be specified by using auditee characteristics such as auditee size
or complexity. Numan & Willekens (2012) also suggests that the audit fee charged by
an incumbent auditor changes with the share of the industry market share held by the
incumbent auditor or the closest competitor. We measured this variable with
Distance_competitor, and although we tried to incorporate it in our study, we found,
rather, a high correlation between Distance_competitor and ALN_CLNT variables.
Finally, since the number of non-audit services being provided by auditors is
increasing, future research might investigate competition among auditors in the
market for non-audit services to see how this affects audit pricing.
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9. Appendix A (tables)
Table 1 Description of independent variables and expected signs
Names Indicators Variables Expected relation toaudit fees
LAF Natural logarithm of audit fees Dependent variable
LNONF Natural logarithm of nonaudit fees Non-audit service demand
COMP Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the product market based on auditee's revenue in the form of sales Product market competition -
COMP_AF Herfindahl concentration index per audit market (based on auditor's revenue in the form of fees) Audit market competition -
AL_CLNT Fees an auditor generates in a 2-digit SIC industry as a percentage of the total fees generated by an
auditor in an MSA
Incumbent auditor's market location +
NAT_SHARE Fees an auditor generates in a 2-digit SIC industry as a percentage of the total fees generated by and
auditor nationwide
Incumbent auditor's market location +
LAGEDU150 Natural log of the number of years after implementation of the 150-hour requirement plus 1 Consequences of the 150-hour requirements implementation +
WDCDIST the distance of auditees' headquarters and the SEC office in Washington, DC Auditees’ exposure to SEC monitoring +
UA Dummy coded 1 if the auditee is part of a Urban Agglomerate area, 0 otherwise Metropolitan size where the auditee is headquartered ?
U Dummy coded 1 if the auditee is part of a Urban area, 0 otherwise Metropolitan size where the auditee is headquartered ?
R Dummy coded 1 if the auditee is part of a Rural area, 0 otherwise Metropolitan size where the auditee is headquartered ?
LSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets at year-end Auditee’s size +
QUICK Quick ratio, measured as the current assets without inventories to current liabilities Short-term capital structure -
ROA Return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets Audit risk ?
LEV Leverage ratio, measured as total debt to total assets Audit risk +
BETA Market risk, relationship between stock volatility and market volatility Market based risk -
LOSS Dummy coded 1 if the auditees net income in prior year is negative, or 0 otherwise Audit risk ?
MB Market to book value of assets Audit risk +
LNSEG Natural logarithm of number of segments of the auditee Organisational complexity +
FIS Dummy coded 1 if fiscal year end is in December, 0 otherwise Indicator variables for non-December end ?
LIT Dummy coded 1 if the auditor is spending a significant portion of its revenues for litigation purposes, 0
otherwise
Litigation risk +
AUDC Dummy coded 1 if auditor changed compared to prior year, 0 otherwise Audit change -
AUD Dummy coded 1 if the auditor is a big-4 audit firm, 0 otherwise Audit quality +
GCON Dummy coded 1 if the auditee has a going concern qualification, 0 otherwise Audit risk +
RES Dummy coded 1 if there is a financial statement restatement, 0 otherwise Audit risk +
NYSE Dummy coded 1 if the auditee is listed in the New York Stock Exchane, 0 otherwise Auditees’ exposure to amended listed standards of NYSE +
LEAD_COUNTY Dummy coded 1 if the auditor is a leader in the county, 0 otherwise Auditor specialization ?
LAVG_WAGE Natural logarithm of average wage by state Demographic control variable +
LHOME Average housing cost for every zip code Demographic control variable ?
LVCOST Cost of living by zip Explanatory variable to control for +
LCPOP Natural logarithm of population size per county Demographic control variable +
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Table 2 Standard Industrial Classification codes and distribution of in-sample companies
SIC-2 Code Industry Description In SampleCompanies SIC-2 Code Industry Description
In Sample
Companies
10 Metal Mining 10 47 Transportation Services 3
12 Coal Mining 5 48 Communications 50
13 Oil And Gas Extraction 66 49 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 85
14 Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 6 50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 31
15 Building Construction General Contractors And Operative Builders 1 51 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 20
16 Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 9 52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile Home Dealers 4
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors 6 53 General Merchandise Stores 10
20 Food And Kindred Products 43 54 Food Stores 8
21 Tobacco Products 4 55 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations 14
22 Textile Mill Products 7 56 Apparel And Accessory Stores 10
23 Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials 10 57 Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 8
24 Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture 9 58 Eating And Drinking Places 22
25 Furniture And Fixtures 12 59 Miscellaneous Retail 23
26 Paper And Allied Products 16 60 Depository Institutions 1
27 Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 24 62 Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services 8
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 113 63 Insurance Carriers 8
29 Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 11 64 Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service 3
30 Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 17 65 Real Estate 2
31 Leather And Leather Products 8 67 Holding And Other Investment Offices 5
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 11 70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places 16
33 Primary Metal Industries 23 72 Personal Services 10
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Transportation Equipment 26 73 Business Services 86
35 Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 82 75 Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 2
36 Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment 96 76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 1
37 Transportation Equipment 35 78 Motion Pictures 4
38 Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And OpticalGoods; Watches And Clocks 83 79 Amusement And Recreation Services 12
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 13 80 Health Services 37
40 Railroad Transportation 5 81 Legal Services 1
42 Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing 13 82 Educational Services 3
44 Water Transportation 8 83 Social Services 1
45 Transportation By Air 12 87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 24
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 6
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Independent Variables
Year Mean Median St. Dev Min Max
2003 13.14297 13 1.417313 9 17
2004 13.65284 14 1.505073 10 18
2005 13.91161 14 1.460989 9 18
2006 14.04762 14 1.407962 10 18
2007 14.04762 14 1.407962 10 18
2008 14.06221 14 1.384542 10 18
2009 14.00461 14 1.366665 10 17
2010 13.98925 14 1.372243 10 17
Total 13.8574 14 1.446483 9 18
Variable Mean Median St. Dev Min Max
lnonf 12.19498 12 1.839025 6 18
comp 0.072179 0.0435629 0.0764896 0.0102114 1
comp_af 0.6578524 0.6228284 0.2921574 0.110748 1
al_clnt 0.5904905 0.62 0.3759594 0 1
nat_share 0.2135721 0.2200654 0.1505933 0.0000151 1
lagedu150 1.496539 1.84055 1.008104 0 3.465736
wdcdist 8751.889 8366.352 4235.262 40.7153 18836.38
ua 0.4101382 0 0.4918822 0 1
u 0.3640553 0 0.4811874 0 1
r 0.03149 0 0.1746463 0 1
lsize 6.600286 6.799177 2.341018 -6.214608 12.61987
quick 1.40058 1.028 1.554546 0.001 34.65
roa -9.360329 3.863 168.4512 -9200 2516.273
lev 34.43696 24.494 174.2672 0.002 14733.33
beta 1.269105 1.199 0.8450204 -5.19 24.038
loss 0.2547043 0 0.4357158 0 1
mb 1.692307 0.9243023 7.681388 0.0028312 434.0952
lnseg 0.763437 1.098612 0.7017358 0 2.302585
fis 0.6801075 1 0.466457 0 1
lit 0.2059332 0 0.4044013 0 1
audc 0.062212 0 0.2415518 0 1
aud 0.7857143 1 0.4103456 0 1
gcon 0.0375384 0 0.1900861 0 1
res 0.1379608 0 0.3448754 0 1
nyse 0.5223694 1 0.4995233 0 1
lavg_wage 10.60588 10.60411 0.1316158 10.21501 10.89117
lead_county 0.0507873 0 0.2195735 0 1
lhome 12.42473 12 0.7499073 9 15
lvcost 1.274159 1.1515 0.4327627 0.708 4.714
lcpop 12.53063 13 1.999813 6 17
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (LAF) between 2003-2010
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables
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Table 4a Correlation Matrix (continued in the next page)
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates significance at the 1% level
Variables lnonf comp comp_af al_clnt nat_share lagedu150 wdcdist ua u r lsize quick roa lev beta
lnonf 1
comp -0.0007 1
comp_af 0.0263** 0.2843*** 1
al_clnt 0.1906*** 0.251*** 0.8186*** 1
nat_share 0.3949*** 0.1679*** 0.1686*** 0.3336*** 1
lagedu150 -0.027*** 0.1091*** 0.2153*** 0.1884*** 0.0455*** 1
wdcdist -0.0614*** 0.0263** 0.1355*** 0.1116*** -0.0232** 0.0912*** 1
ua 0.0773*** -0.0162 -0.4648*** -0.405*** -0.0151 -0.023** -0.27*** 1
u -0.0265*** -0.023** 0.0945*** 0.0699*** 0.0317*** -0.1142*** 0.2324*** -0.6359*** 1
r -0.0635*** 0.0307*** 0.1612*** 0.1519*** -0.0137 0.0937*** 0.0398*** -0.1438*** -0.133*** 1
lsize 0.6823*** 0.0398*** 0.0995*** 0.3049*** 0.5242*** 0.0715*** -0.0161 0.0425*** -0.0091 -0.0197* 1
quick -0.1061*** -0.081*** -0.1359*** -0.1452*** -0.0931*** -0.0992*** -0.0469*** 0.0283*** -0.01 -0.0473*** -0.1774*** 1
roa 0.1069*** 0.0274*** 0.0399*** 0.0818*** 0.0809*** 0.0308*** -0.0263** 0.0114 -0.032*** 0.0063 0.2163*** 0.0229** 1
lev -0.0659*** -0.0167 -0.0149 -0.0378*** -0.0364*** -0.0008 0.0375*** -0.0186* 0.026** -0.0006 -0.1282*** -0.041*** -0.7944*** 1
beta -0.003 0.0329*** -0.042*** -0.0298*** 0.0174* 0.019* 0.026** -0.0288*** 0.0354*** -0.0335*** -0.0195* 0.0352*** 0.0189* 0.0101 1
loss -0.2296*** -0.0658*** -0.138*** -0.1751*** -0.1869*** -0.0485*** -0.0204** 0.0142 -0.0096 0.0066 -0.3431*** 0.1285*** -0.1424*** 0.0716*** 0.1462***
mb -0.0978*** -0.0197* -0.0381*** -0.0852*** -0.0775*** -0.0495*** 0.0083 -0.0103 0.0385*** -0.0112 -0.2046*** 0.0112 -0.6272*** 0.3965*** 0.0058
lnseg 0.3383*** -0.0322*** 0.0543*** 0.138*** 0.2106*** 0.0556*** -0.0352*** 0.0079 -0.0281*** 0.0149 0.3703*** -0.1203*** 0.0597*** -0.0351*** -0.0434***
fis 0.0522*** -0.0842*** -0.0547*** -0.0066 0.0146 0.0341*** -0.0159 0.0679*** -0.0612*** -0.0211** 0.1142*** 0.0194* -0.0077 0.0253** 0.0088
lit 0.3095*** -0.0182* 0.006 0.0935*** 0.164*** -0.0453*** -0.0233** 0.0316*** 0.0042 -0.0114 0.3674*** -0.0524*** 0.0297*** -0.0185* -0.0231**
audc -0.1474*** -0.0258** -0.0411*** -0.0969*** -0.1827*** -0.0083 -0.0051 0.0172* -0.0271*** 0.0015 -0.1752*** 0.0184* -0.0137 0.0051 -0.0012
aud 0.4456*** 0.0726*** 0.1135*** 0.3115*** 0.6681*** 0.03*** 0.0222** -0.0499*** 0.053*** -0.0212** 0.6067*** -0.0341*** 0.1108*** -0.055*** 0.0503***
gcon -0.2034*** -0.0479*** -0.0471*** -0.1093*** -0.1764*** 0.0125 0.0204** -0.0092 0.0155 -0.0045 -0.3303*** -0.0686*** -0.2816*** 0.1813*** -0.0022
res -0.0659*** -0.0093 0.0163 0.0222** -0.0043 -0.0295*** -0.0057 -0.0173* 0.0024 0.0121 -0.0644*** 0.0053 0.0067 -0.0095 0.0047
nyse 0.4399*** 0.042*** 0.0784*** 0.2096*** 0.3718*** 0.1146*** -0.0115 0.086*** -0.0415*** -0.0411*** 0.6189*** -0.2118*** 0.071*** -0.0257** 0.0092
lavg_wage 0.0383*** -0.0802*** -0.2864*** -0.2459*** -0.0582*** -0.3768*** -0.1716*** 0.2793*** -0.0826*** -0.1561*** 0.0109 0.091*** -0.0082 -0.0117 0.0136
lead_county 0.1988*** 0.2006*** 0.0154 0.095*** 0.2587*** -0.0025 -0.014 0.0706*** -0.0196* -0.0221** 0.2209*** -0.0425*** 0.0125 -0.0041 0.0334***
lhome 0.0646*** -0.0107 -0.309*** -0.2562*** -0.01 -0.3096*** -0.2006*** 0.4179*** -0.1594*** -0.1281*** 0.0136 0.0843*** -0.0285*** 0.0128 0.0146
lvcost 0.1249*** -0.0378*** -0.3441*** -0.272*** 0.0197* -0.4204*** -0.2345*** 0.426*** -0.1716*** -0.118*** 0.0666*** 0.0854*** -0.0136 -0.0013 -0.0012
lcpop 0.0277*** -0.0554*** -0.155*** -0.1386*** -0.0408*** -0.3792*** -0.0251** 0.0864*** 0.0846*** -0.0618*** -0.002 0.0299*** -0.0265*** 0.0192* 0.0315***
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Table 4b Correlation Matrix
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates significance at the 1% level
Variables loss mb lnseg fis lit audc aud gcon res nyse lavg_wage lead_county lhome lvcost lcpop
lnonf
comp
comp_af
al_clnt
nat_share
lagedu150
wdcdist
ua
u
r
lsize
quick
roa
lev
beta
loss 1
mb 0.074*** 1
lnseg -0.1463*** -0.0673*** 1
fis 0.0176* -0.0028 0.1301*** 1
lit -0.0651*** -0.0185* 0.1095*** 0.028*** 1
audc 0.0792*** -0.0005 -0.0597*** -0.0133 -0.0516*** 1
aud -0.2224*** -0.0981*** 0.1979*** 0.0404*** 0.1674*** -0.2413*** 1
gcon 0.2505*** 0.249*** -0.1056*** 0.002 -0.0536*** 0.0604*** -0.2433*** 1
res 0.0328*** -0.005 -0.0244** -0.0002 -0.0273*** 0.0406*** -0.0164 0.0043 1
nyse -0.2685*** -0.067*** 0.3274*** 0.1237*** 0.1894*** -0.1162*** 0.4055*** -0.1567*** -0.0246** 1
lavg_wage 0.0985*** -0.0007 0.0203** -0.0155 0.0018 0.0108 -0.0671*** -0.017* -0.1155*** -0.0824*** 1
lead_county -0.0198* -0.0119 0.0839*** 0.0215** 0.125*** -0.0455*** 0.1093*** -0.03*** -0.012 0.1419*** 0.0074 1
lhome 0.0354*** 0.0399*** -0.0224** 0.0362*** 0.056*** 0.0185* -0.0191* 0.034*** -0.0344*** -0.0478*** 0.4294*** 0.0617*** 1
lvcost 0.0288*** 0.0253** 0.0032 0.0262** 0.0861*** 0.0047 0.0172* 0.0129 -0.036*** -0.0115 0.506*** 0.1017*** 0.8123*** 1
lcpop 0.0203** 0.0217** -0.0029 -0.0243** 0.0196* 0.0004 -0.0377*** 0.0184* -0.0093 -0.0235** 0.259*** 0.0372*** 0.2674*** 0.3542*** 1
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Table 5 OLS regression output
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| VIF
Dep. Variable: laf
cons 1.231392 0.09097916 1.35 0.176 -0.5519961 3.014779
lnonf 0.1196005 0.0051521 23.21 0 0.1095014 0.1296997 2.15
comp 0.5157174 0.1606706 3.21 0.001 0.2007684 0.8306664 4.17
comp_af -0.3233038 0.0418 -7.73 0 -0.4052409 -0.2413667 4.13
al_clnt 0.3256679 0.0331666 9.82 0 0.2606543 0.3906816 4.01
nat_share -0.0092614 0.0618862 -0.15 0.881 -0.1305717 0.1120489 2.25
lagedu150 0.0357749 0.0092115 3.88 0 0.0177183 0.0538315 2.34
wdcdist 2.72E-06 1.56E-06 1.74 0.082 -3.47E-07 5.78E-06 1.18
ua 0.0874234 0.0214468 4.08 0 0.045383 0.1294638 3.35
u 0.0639616 0.0186546 3.43 0.001 0.0273947 0.1005286 2.31
r -0.0218151 0.0394062 -0.55 0.58 -0.0990599 0.0554296 1.2
lsize 0.4156467 0.0060543 68.65 0 0.403779 0.4275144 4.37
quick -0.0278603 0.0043301 -6.43 0 -0.0363482 -0.0193724 1.21
roa -0.0002113 0.0000854 -2.47 0.013 -0.0003788 -0.0000438 4.14
lev 5.01E-06 0.0000679 0.07 0.941 -0.0001281 0.0001381 2.94
beta 0.0777689 0.0104157 7.47 0 0.0573518 0.098186 1.12
loss 0.1514126 0.0167888 9.02 0 0.1185029 0.1843224 1.31
mb 0.003489 0.001441 2.42 0.015 0.0006643 0.0063138 1.81
lnseg 0.1701143 0.0101814 16.71 0 0.1501565 0.1900721 1.38
fis 0.0360195 0.0140956 2.56 0.011 0.0083891 0.0636499 1.2
lit 0.1457453 0.0165944 8.78 0 0.1132168 0.1782738 1.25
audc -0.0319016 0.0309954 -1.03 0.303 -0.0926593 0.0288562 1.09
aud 0.2418154 0.0255911 9.45 0 0.1916514 0.2919794 2.51
gcon 0.1906368 0.0466737 4.08 0 0.0991463 0.2821273 1.29
res 0.0629305 0.0185102 3.4 0.001 0.0266466 0.0992144 1.05
nyse 0.0115355 0.0169837 0.68 0.497 -0.0217562 0.0448272 1.97
lavg_wage 0.6627877 0.0843552 7.86 0 0.4974334 0.8281421 3.66
lead_county 0.1979099 0.0293569 6.74 0 0.140364 0.2554559 1.22
lhome 0.043313 0.0140824 3.08 0.002 0.0157084 0.0709175 3.23
lvcost 0.1147454 0.0279812 4.1 0 0.0598963 0.1695945 3.94
lcpop 0.0104911 0.0035159 2.98 0.003 0.0035992 0.0173831 1.36
Year Dummies
Industry Dummies
Model Summary statistics:
Number of obs 9521
F( 91,  9429) 509.62
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.8293
Root MSE 0.58436
[95% Conf.Interval]
Included
Included

